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Abstract 
 
 
The paper addresses the issue of French banks efficiency, compared to their homologous from 
Europe and the United States. The analysis is realized on a sample formed by the ten biggest 
banks from France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States, over 
the period 1994-2006. The Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) method is employed. The 
results show an improvement in cost-efficiency of French and Spanish banks, while in the 
other countries a decline in cost-efficiency is noted. We proceed to several tests of 
convergence, showing that inefficient banks have reduced the gap during the period 1994-
2006. In a second step analysis, we focus on the factors standing behind the efficiency scores 
obtained through DEA methodology. These are bank-specific variables, the macro 
environment, the regulatory regime and the non-bank financial sector development. We use a 
standard censured Tobit model and show that capitalized, newly established banks, with tighter 
ratios of Tier 1 capital and operating in a country with a lower GDP per capita record the 
highest cost-efficiency scores. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The harmonization of the European market of financial services and the increasing globalization of 
financial markets bring about the prime importance of banks competitiveness in different countries. 
Interesting perspectives can be obtained through analyzes carried out on banking systems of several 
countries3. The existence of differences in banks behavior in the European economies is a key factor that 
might explain the velocity of convergence in the European banking system or the probability of future 
cross-border mergers and acquisitions.  
 
The European banking system encountered important changes since 90s. The Second Banking Directive 
(1989)4 established the single banking license: any bank authorized to provide banking services in a EU 
state is allowed to provide banking services in any EU state (commonly called the European passport). By 
reducing legal barriers to entry on foreign banking markets, this directive was expected to favor the cross-
border expansion of banking services, through either the creation of branches or the supply of cross-
border financial services. 
 
Another step towards an integrated European banking market consists of the single currency creation, in 
1999. This has reduced the exchange risk for banks in the cross-border acquisitions and in the supply of 
cross-border services. Meanwhile, several legal obstacles continue to exist in the process of banking 
markets integration. The Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP, 1999-2004) was launched in 1999, having 
three main objectives: i) the creation of a single EU wholesale market for financial services and products; 
ii) the creation of an open and secure financial retail market; and iii) the implementation of common 
prudential and supervision rules. The fragmentation of banking supervision, at national levels, continues 
to be one of the main obstacles to bank strengthening in Europe. 
 
According to the European Commission, the Financial Services Action Plan has been entirely respected 
and realized within the required time, representing “an important success for a European program of such 
magnitude and complexity". At the end of 2004, 93% of the 42 measures of the FSAP have been adopted 
in the shortest possible time by presidents and governments5. The FSAP has allowed important advances 
in financial markets integration process, especially by the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 
(MIFID) and the im proved competition between market participants (stock markets, platforms and big 
banks), as well as the international dimension of orders in investment banking (set up the 1st of 
November 2007). Meanwhile, the European integration contains two fields that deserve further advances; 
these are the post-market operations (clearing and delivery settlement) and the asset management. 
Nowadays, retail banking has still a national dimension. Several obstacles continue to exist, especially 
related to consumers' protection and fiscal rules (Weill, 2008). 
 
The White Paper of financial services policy for the period 2005-2010 presents the European 
Commission's objectives in terms of financial services policy: (i) the strengthening of the advances carried 
out for an integrated, open, inclusive, competitive and economically efficient European financial market; 
(ii) the elimination of last significant obstacles, in order to obtain the free circulation of financial services 
and of capital everywhere in the EU, at the lowest costs - with a level of prudential control and behavior 
rules that guarantee a high degree of financial stability for consumers; (iii) the introduction, respect and 
continue evaluation of existing legislative framework and rigorous application of a “better regulation" 
approach for all future initiative; (iv) the improvement in cooperation and convergence in terms of control 
in the EU, the improvement of relationships with other financial markets of the world and the 
strengthening of European influence in the world. 
 
                                                 
3 According to Berger and Humphrey (1997), an area of research deserving additional attention concerns efficiency 
comparisons among countries. 
4 Directive no. 89/646 of December 15, 1989 (JOCE L 386 from December 30, 1989, p. 1). 
5 The European Council of Lisbon, 23-24 March 2000, confirmed by prior European Councils, of whom the 
European Council of Brussels, 20-21 March 2003. 
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Highly active on the European banking and financial landscape, European banks have always been 
favorable to the European integration. The large majority of recent studies show the positive effect of 
integration on economic growth and employment in Europe. An analysis published by London 
Economics in 2002 shows that financial integration of bonds and equities markets might lead to: (i) an 
increase of 1.1% in European GDP; (ii) an increase of 6% in productive investment and 0.8% in private 
consumption; (iii) an increase of 0.5% in total employment. 
 
The IMF carried out several analyzes in 2007, estimating the benefits of the European financial 
integration. A comparison of the sector-based productivity growth rates in the Euro area and the United 
States has been realized; over the period 1996-2003, half of the difference in growth rates (less than 0.5% 
per year) was due to financial integration (except for the insurance sector). Nevertheless, it is difficult to 
quantify the indirect effects of intermediation on productivity; according to IMF, these latter effects might 
be higher. 
 
When talking about financial services, the integration suppose: (i) for the banking industry - important 
economies of scope and scale, a better risk spreading, incentives for innovation and an improved 
competition in a competitive, henceforth worldwide, context; (ii) for consumers - the harmonization of 
the protection rules providing a fair level of protection everywhere in Europe, a better comparability of 
supplies, a fall in prices, as well as a larger range of products and services; (iii) for the European economy - 
an important contribution to the objectives of growth, competition and employment, defined in March 
2000 by the European Council of Lisbon; (iv) the creation of a huge and liquid financial market, capable 
of supporting economic growth by a reduction in the cost of credit for borrowers (firms and households). 
 
In this context, we consider important the examination, at a microeconomic level, of the influence that all 
these evolutions might have on the performance of the European banking system. Even though the FSAP 
measures have been just recently implemented (their appraisal started in 2005 by European Commission), 
we can today stand back to assess them, compared to early 1989 (the Second Banking Directive). 
Therefore, the present study intends to measure the cost-efficiency of French banks (i.e. the ability of a 
bank to minimize its costs in order to produce a fixed combination of outputs), compared to their 
homologous from Europe and the United States. The questions that we raise are the following: are French 
banks competitive compared to their foreign homologous? Are we witnessing an improvement in 
efficiency, in France and other countries, since 1994? Can we talk about the efficiency convergence in the 
analyzed countries? What are the factors standing behind the efficiency scores? 
 
Our work stresses the performance of the French banking system in the context of cross- border 
movements (in 2008, approximately half of the output of the three biggest French banks was obtained 
outside France, of whom an important part in Europe), compared to the banking systems of other 
European and American countries. 
 
The analysis of cost performance evolution in the French banking system is an important issue for several 
reasons. First, the improvement in cost performances should allow for a reduction in interest rates on 
lending and, consequently, this will encourage an increase in investment. Second, French banking system 
performance is a key element in future cross-border expanding of French banks. Basically, weak results of 
French banks signify lower possibilities of setting up abroad compared to cost efficient competitors; it 
equally means the possibility of easier entries of foreign banks on the French market. 
 
Based on these aspects, we apply the cost efficiency approach (i.e. the ability of a bank to minimize its 
costs in order to produce a fixed combination of outputs) over the period 1994-2006, for a sample formed 
by European and American banks. The methodology used is the efficiency frontier. We intend to calculate 
the cost efficiency of banks from France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United 
States and to examine its evolution over a longer span of time compared to previous studies (a brief 
presentation is realized in table 1). 
 
We start by estimating national cost frontiers, specific to each country. This choice is motivated by at least 
two reasons: 
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- first, important differences exist in the economic conditions of each country. The measures of 
efficiency vary with regulation and supervision interventions in the financial system. The 
transposition in national law of European directives allows for differences among EU member 
states. At the same time, important differences exist within countries, in terms of the intensity of 
competition between financial institutions, the level and quality of services associated to financial 
products, the financial market development; all these aspects affect the measures of efficiency. 
Therefore, a high level of efficiency for institutions from a considered country does not 
necessarily imply that they are more efficient in the environment of other countries. 
- second, even though there are no differences in economic conditions or these differences are 
controlled by the econometric methodologies, the performance of institutions abroad cannot be 
representative. If some institutions are efficient in their country of origin, they can encounter 
some difficulties in other countries because of organizational limits in the functioning and 
supervision of institutions from distance or because of the difficulties related to differences of 
language, culture, money, regulation and others. 
 
We use the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) approach and we determine the cost- efficiency scores for 
banks from the six analyzed countries, annually, over the period 1994-2006. Our work is in line with Weill 
(2006b) and consists of a comparative analysis of the efficiency trend of the ten biggest banks from 
France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, Italy and the United-States. In a first step analysis we 
determine the cost-efficiency scores of banks for each country, year by year, using the DEA technique and 
the DEA-Solver program. The results show an improvement in the cost efficiency of French and Spanish 
banks, opposed to other countries from the sample, where a decline in efficiency is obtained. 
 
We test for the existence of β convergence, to see whether there was a convergence trend in banking 
efficiency over the analyzed period of time (as in Weill, 2006b, 2008). 
 
In a second step analysis, we look for factors standing behind the efficiency indicators previously 
obtained. These are some bank specific variables (equity as a share of total assets, ownership, size and 
age), the macroeconomic environment, the regulatory framework and the development of non-banking 
financial sector. Due to the limited nature of the dependent variable (note that the DEA index ranges 
between 0 and 1), a censured Tobit regression model is used for the estimations (performed with the help 
of Stata program). 
 
The analysis of the convergence, realized separately for each country, shows a “catching-up" process by 
the least efficient banks, except for banks from the United Kingdom. The main results are the following: 
capitalized, newly established banks or banking groups, with a tighter ratio of Tier 1 capital and operating 
in a country with a lower GDP per capita record the highest cost-efficiency scores. 
 
Our paper makes several contributions to the literature on banking efficiency. First of all, we proceed to 
an international comparison analysis and we seek to cover a larger period of time, compared to the 
existing studies. Second, by looking at the evolution of the efficiency score, we show the existence of the 
convergence, since least efficient banks are catching-up their efficient homologous. Third, our analysis is 
extended by an examination of the factors standing behind the efficiency scores and this brings about the 
originality of our work, as we take a deeper look at the figures on efficiency, seeking to explain them. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the literature on 
bank efficiency analysis. Section 3 introduces and describes the methodology used in this study. The data 
set and variables are presented in Section 4. Section 5 presents the results of Data Envelopment Analysis 
and explains the differences in cross-bank efficiency indicators. Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Review of literature  
 
The first study on efficiency and productivity at a micro level is that of Farrel (1957) (section 3.1 below 
presents the concept of efficiency), but the literature on cost-efficiency started to be applied to banks only 
during the 90s. Berger and Humphrey (1997) inventory 130 studies applying efficiency frontiers to 
financial institutions from 21 countries. 
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A reduced number of studies focused on the efficiency of French banks. We can however distinguish two 
categories: studies that focus entirely on French banks; and studies consisting of international comparisons 
of bank efficiency.  
 
We mention four analyzes that belong to the former category. 
 
Dietsch (1996) performs the first analysis on the efficiency of French banks. The author uses a parametric 
method (the Free Distribution Approach, DFA) and estimates the cost-efficiency of 375 commercial and 
savings banks, over the period 1988-1992. The results show the existence of an average cost-efficiency of 
56.1% and 70.7%, with a truncation of 1% and, respectively, 5%. The analysis of the relationship between 
the cost efficiency and the risk-taking supports the assumption that less efficient banks take excessive 
risks. 
 
Dietsch and Weill (1999) use a nonparametric method, the DEA technique, for measuring the technical 
efficiency of 93 French deposit banks in 1994. The average scores vary between 78% and 91%, depending 
on the retained productive combination. The inputs are: personnel expenses, interest expenses relative to 
total borrowed funds and other non-financial expenses; the outputs are: credits, demand deposits, savings 
and other remunerated assets. The analysis of the determinants of French banks' efficiency shows the lack 
of a clear relationship with the size and the existence of a negative relationship with the risk-taking. 
 
Chauveau and Couppey (2000) examine the technical efficiency on a sample of 38 French banking groups, 
over the period 1994-1997, and use the DEA technique. Their results show the lack of major problems of 
productive inefficiency in the sample of banks.  
 
Weill (2006b) analyzes the evolution of cost-efficiency of 93 French banks, over the period 1992-2000. 
The author uses two parametric approaches to calculate the cost-efficiency scores: the Stochastic Frontier 
Approach (SFA) and a system of equations composed of a Fourier-flexible cost function and its associated 
input cost share equations derived using the Sheppard's lemma. The results show an increase in cost-
efficiency between 1992 and 2000, the average scores going from 77.20% to 83.98%. According to the 
Rosse-Panzar test of competition, the increase in efficiency is not related to the increase in competition. 
Weill (2006b) equally tests for the convergence in French banks' efficiency, showing its existence over the 
period 1992-2000; this translates the catching-up process of the least efficient banks over the last decade. 
 
Besides studies entirely orientated toward French banks, an important number of international 
comparisons of banks' efficiency exist. The latter have become abundant these last years, being 
characterized by the use of BankScope database. Two categories of international comparisons can be 
distinguished: those estimating a national frontier for each country, opposed to those estimating common 
frontiers to several countries as a whole. 
 
A reference from the first category is the analysis of Berger et al.(2000). The authors use the Stochastic 
Frontier Approach (SFA) and estimate the cost and production frontiers for five countries (France, 
Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States), separately for each country. The efficiency 
of domestic and foreign banks is estimated, over the period 1993-1998 for the US and, respectively, 1992-
1997 for the European economies. The results show an average cost-efficiency of 70.9% in France, 79.3% 
in Germany, 91.5% in Spain, 79.1% in the United Kingdom and 77.4% in the United States. The main 
result is that domestic banks present higher cost and higher production efficiency scores, compared to 
foreign banks that operate in these countries. 
 
Weill (2004) measures the cost-efficiency of banks from 5 European countries (France, Germany, Italy, 
Spain and Switzerland), over the period 1992-1998 and uses three approaches: SFA, DFA and DEA. The 
analysis is based on the measure of national frontiers (and not of a common frontier), showing the 
consistency of technical frontiers of efficiency in five different frameworks. The author compares the 
means and coefficients of correlation, two aspects of public policy and the correlation with the standard 
value of performance. The conclusion is that of a lack of robustness among approaches. 
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Weill (2008) calculates the cost efficiency of banks from ten EU countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom), over the period 1994-
2005 and uses the Stochastic Frontier Approach. The results show an improvement in the efficiency of 
the entire EU banking systems, and the existence of convergence in efficiency of all EU countries. 
 
The second category of studies estimates a common frontier, allowing for a comparison of bank efficiency 
within different countries; all banks are compared with the best banks from all the analyzed countries. The 
main assumption of these studies is that all the banks have the same technology, and this may lead to 
efficiency gaps resulting from different technologies. In reality, the gaps of efficiency between countries 
might be caused by different economic environments and not necessarily by differences in managerial 
performance (Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas, 2000). 
 
Allen and Rai (1996) estimate the overall cost function of 194 international banks (from 15 countries), 
over the period 1988-1992, in order to determine the inefficiencies of inputs and outputs. According to 
their analysis, the inefficiencies of inputs are higher than those of outputs. Another result is that the DFA 
approach overestimates the size of inefficiency scores, compared to the SFA approach. Large banks have 
the highest value of inefficiency of inputs (27.5% of the cost) and significant levels of diseconomies of 
scale. For the other banks, the inefficiency is of 15% of the cost, with reduced economies of scale for 
small banks. 
 
Pastor, Pérez and Quesada (1997) compare the efficiency of several European banks (Spain, Austria, 
Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, Belgium and France) to that of American banks, in 1992. Under the 
hypothesis of constant returns of scale, French banks are the most efficient (with an average efficiency of 
95%), followed by Spanish, Belgian, Italian, German, American, Austrian and English banks. On the other 
hand, the reduced productivity of French banks is underlined (they are in the second last position, in front 
of Spanish banks). 
 
Chaffai and Dietsch (1999) propose the breaking down of cost inefficiency in technical and allocative 
inefficiencies, based on the methodology of distances in inputs. The authors use the stochastic frontier 
approach. The application on a sample of European banks from 11 countries (Austria, Belgium, Germany, 
Denmark, Spain, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherland and Portugal), over the 
period 1992-1996, shows that on average the allocative inefficiency increases bank costs by 25%, and so 
does technical inefficiency. Another result is the existence of a negative correlation between technical and 
allocative inefficiencies. 
 
Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas (2000) analyze, by the DFA approach, the effect of the environment 
conditions on the cost-efficiency of French and Spanish banking industries, over the period 1988-1992. 
The results are the following: without taking into account the environmental variables, the cost-efficiency 
scores of Spanish banks are more reduced than those of French banks; the introduction of the 
environmental variables in the model reduces the differences between the two banking industries. 
 
Altunbas et al. (2001) proceed to an analysis on a large sample of European banks (from 15 countries), 
over the period 1989-1997; they use the SFA approach. The results show that on average English and 
Swedish banks are more inefficient than other European banks. The most efficient banking systems are 
those of Austria, Denmark, Germany and Italy. Another important result is the rise in the impact of 
technical progress on reducing bank costs, with banks size. Over the entire period of analysis, an increase 
in banks efficiency is observed. 
 
Chaffai, Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas (2001) propose a Malmquist index that allows for measuring the 
differences in productivity among banks from different countries and distinguish two components: 
differences caused by purely technological effects and, respectively, differences caused by environmental 
effects. This index is used for explaining differences in productivity among banks from four Euro area 
countries (France, Germany, Italy and Spain), over the period 1993-1997. The results show that, on 
average, differences caused by environmental conditions are higher compared to differences in banks 
technology. 
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Lozano-Vivas, Pastor and Hasan (2001) estimate the production frontier over a sample of 612 banks from 
ten EU countries (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherland, Spain and the 
United Kingdom) for 1993. First, the authors proceed to the estimation of technical efficiency for each 
country in the sample, by the non-parametric approach (DEA) only with banking variables. Then, they 
build a DEA model, including some environmental factors (per capita GDP, per capita wage, population 
density, demand density, capital ratio and profitability) and banking variables, in order to normalize the 
environmental conditions, specific to each country. The results show that adverse (favorable) 
environmental conditions are a positive (negative) factor for banking industry of the country of origin. 
Being technically efficient is a dissuasive element for foreign competition. Globally, banks from Spain, 
Portugal and Denmark are relatively more efficient and successful in maintaining high scores of efficiency 
if they decide to move and install in another European country from the sample. At the same time, it 
would be more difficult for banks from other countries to settle profitable networks in Spain, Portugal 
and Denmark because of adverse environmental conditions. Furthermore, Italian and French banks are 
the least efficient abroad. 
 
Vander Vennet (2002) analyzes the cost and production efficiencies in financial conglomerates and 
universal banks from Europe. The analysis is carried out on a sample of 2375 banks from 17 EU countries 
(Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherland, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK), for 1995 and 1996 and uses the SFA 
approach. The relationship between profitability and several variables is equally analyzed for different 
subgroups of European banks. The results show that financial conglomerates are more efficient in term of 
income compared to their specialized competitors, while universal banks are the most efficient in terms of 
cost and production. 
 
The last two studies conclude on the existence of important differences in banks efficiency among the EU 
member states. 
 
By the brief presentation of these studies, we conclude of the existence of a dispersion in the average 
efficiency scores, depending on the efficiency concept and the method analyzed. As one can see in table 1 
below, the results of the large majority of studies consist of an average efficiency score between 70% and 
80%. As far as the applied approach is concerned, both parametric (SFA and DFA), and nonparametric 
(DEA) methods have been used in estimating the efficiency of French banks. 
 
Our work adds to the existing literature on cost-efficiency of French banks; we estimate it compared to 
the cost-efficiency of other European and American banks, over the period 1994-2006 and we use a 
nonparametric method- the DEA approach. 
  
Table 1. Analyzes on French banks efficiency. 
Authors 
Characteristics  
(approach, estimated frontier, period) 
Estimation of the average 
annual efficiency (France) 
France   
Dietsch (1996) DFA, cost frontier, 1988-1992 56.1% - 70.7% 
Dietsch and Weill (1999) DEA, production frontier, 1994 78-91% 
Chauveau and Couppey (2000) 
 
DEA, production frontier, 1994-1997 
 
89% (in 1994), 94% (in 1995 
and 1996), 95% (in 1997) 
Weill (2006b) 
 
SFA,  cost frontier, 1992-2000 
 
77.2% (in 1992) – 83.98% (in 
2000 
 International comparisons (national frontier)  
Berger et al. (2000) DFA, cost and profit frontier, 1992-1997 70.9% 
Weill (2004) 
 
DEA, DFA, SFA, cost frontier, 1992-1998 
 
40.16% (DEA); 49.76% 
(FDA) ; 70.58% (SFA)  
Weill (2008) SFA, cost frontier, 1994-2005 
78.9%(in 1994) – 85.48%(in 
2005) 
International comparisons (common frontier)  
Allen and Rai (1996) 
 
DFA, SFA, cost frontier, 1988-1992 
 
73.4% (small banks); 84.3% 
(large banks)  
Pastor et al. (1997) DEA, production frontier, 1992 95% 
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Chaffai and Dietsch (1999) 
 
SFA, cost frontier, 1992-1996 
 
74% (Cobb-Douglas frontier); 
83% (translog frontier) 
Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas (2000) DFA, cost frontier, 1988-1992 77.5% 
Altunbas et al. (2001) 
 
SFA, cost frontier, 1989-1997 
 
71.2%(in 1989) – 75.6% (in 
1997)  
Chaffai et al. (2001) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SFA, production frontier, 1993-1997 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
French banks might increase 
their productivity by 20% 
(without differences in 
environment) and, respectively, 
by 18% (with differences in 
environment), by using the 
technology of German banks. 
Lozano-Vivas et al. (2001) 
 
 
 
 
DEA, production frontier, 1993 
 
 
 
 
24.23% (without considering 
the differences in 
environment) ; 40.98% (when 
considering the differences in 
environment)   
Vander Vennet (2002) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SFA, cost and profit frontier, 1995, 1996 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cost efficiency : 
-traditional banking activity: 
68.2% (financial 
conglomerates), 70.8% 
(specialized banks); 
- traditional and non-
traditional banking activity: 
81.5% (financial 
conglomerates); 79.2% 
(specialized banks). 
Profit efficiency : 68.7% 
(financial conglomerates); 
67.1% (specialized banks)  
       Note. DEA: data envelopment analysis; DFA: distribution free analysis; SFA: stochastic frontier analysis. 
 
We will further present the concept of efficiency, as well as the methodology applied in estimating the 
efficiency. 
 
 
3. Efficiency: concepts and measurement 
 
3.1 Concepts 
 
Farrell (1957) laid the foundation to measure productivity and efficiency studies at the micro level. His 
main contributions consisted of two issues: the definition of the efficiency and productivity, and the 
calculation of the benchmark technology and efficiency measures. The fundamental assumption is that of 
a perfect input-output allocation that allows for inefficient operations. Inefficiency is defined as the 
distance of a firm from a frontier production function accepted as benchmark. The radial 
contraction/expansion connecting inefficient observed points with (unobserved) reference points on the 
productivity frontier is the basis for this measure. If a firm's actual production point lies on the frontier, it 
is perfectly efficient. If it lies below the frontier then it is inefficient. The ratio of the actual to potential 
production defines the level of efficiency of the individual firm (Decision Making Unit, DMU). 
 
Two components are proposed by Farrel for defining the efficiency: the technical efficiency and the 
allocative efficiency. The former reflects the ability of a DMU to minimize input use in order to produce a 
given amount of output. The latter reflects the ability of a DMU to use inputs in optimal proportions, 
given their respective prices and production technology. Considered together, these two measures 
represent a total efficiency measure (Coelli et al., 1997). Efficiency ratios take a value between zero and 
one, where one indicates that the DMU is fully efficient. For instance, an efficiency score measured 
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against a cost frontier of 90% signifies that the DMU could have reduced costs by 10% without altering its 
output vector. 
 
The estimation of efficiency can be categorized according to the assumptions and the techniques used to 
construct the efficient frontier. On one hand, parametric methods estimate the frontier with statistical 
methods. On the other hand, nonparametric methods rely on linear programming to calculate piecewise 
linear segments of the efficient frontier. Parametric methods impose an explicit functional form for both 
the frontier and deviations from it (i.e. the inefficiency). In contrast, nonparametric methods do neither 
impose any assumptions about functional form of the frontier, nor about inefficiency. The main drawback 
of nonparametric methods is that they do not include the random error in the estimation of efficiency, so 
that the distance to the efficiency frontier is entirely measured as inefficiency. 
 
We will further present the nonparametric methods, insisting on the methodology employed in our work - 
the DEA technique. This technique has been first used in industrial economy studies; it started to be 
applied to financial institutions, namely to banks, at mid 90s (Chauveau and Couppey, 2000). The work of 
Sherman and Gold (1985) is presented as the first application of this method to banks. Afterwards, the 
contributions multiplied. Cook and Seiford (2009) provide a very detailed review of major research thrusts 
in DEA that have emerged over the past three decades, since the seminal work of Charnes et al. (1978). 
The focus of their work is on methodological developments, insisting on: various models for measuring 
efficiency; approaches to incorporating restrictions on multipliers; considerations regarding the status of 
variables; and modeling of data variation. The authors present various DEA models, such as: the CRTS 
model, the VRTS model, the additive measures, the Slacks-based measures, the Russel measures and other 
non-radial models. The detailed presentation of all these models is beyond the scope of our work, but the 
reader can report to Cook and Seiford (2009) for a further look. 
 
3.2 Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
 
The DEA technique was introduced by Charnes et al. (1978), allowing the measurement of the efficiency 
of a DMU by comparing it to the most efficient units; these way, the measures of performance obtained 
are relative. The initial model has an input orientation and assumes constant return to scale (we will 
further use the CCR notation for this model). 
 
In the case of a constant return to scale (CRTS) technology, the linear programming method establishes 
which of the decision-making units (in our case banks) determines the envelopment surface. The latter is 
referred to as the empirical production function or efficient frontier. This benchmark frontier is a linear 
combination of the efficient banks in the sample. The set of best frontier observations are those for which 
no other DMU or linear combination of units has as much or more of every output (given a fixed amount 
of inputs - for an output orientated model) or as little or less of every input (given a fixed amount of 
outputs – for an input orientated model). The DEA frontier is formed as the linear combination that 
connects the set of these best practice observations, yielding a convex production possibility set. The 
DEA provides an analysis of relative efficiency for multiple input/output situations, by evaluating each 
DMU and measuring its performance relative to an envelopment surface composed of best practice units. 
The units that do not lie on the surface are considered inefficient. This way, the method provides a 
measure of relative efficiency. 
 
We proceed to a brief description of the underlying linear programming model. We assume that there are 
K inputs and M outputs for every DMU. For the i th DMU the inputs and outputs are represented by 
vectors xi and yi. For each DMU we intend to obtain a measure of the ratio of all outputs over all inputs, 
such as iiii xvyu
'' / , where iu  and iv  are vectors of weights. The following problem is proposed in order 
to select the optimal weights: 
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Such a problem has an infinite number of solutions. This can be avoided by introducing a constraint 
1' =ixv , and we obtain the multiplier form of the linear programming problem: 
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where u’ and v’ are replaced with µ and σ. We use the duality property of this linear programming 
problem, and we can derive an equivalent envelopment form: 
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0≥iλ  
where λ is a N*1 vector of constants and θ, a scalar, is the efficiency score for the ith DMU2. Note that 
10 ≤≤ iθ ; if θi is equal to 1, the DMU is located on the efficiency frontier and is globally efficient. Due 
to fewer numbers of constraints, this formulation is usually used for computations.  
 
However, this approach is simplified, as it assumes a constant return to scale. This assumption is 
appropriate only when all banks are operating at an optimal scale. Nevertheless, we can mention several 
factors that may determine banks not to operate at an optimal scale; these might be: imperfect 
competition, leverage concerns, certain prudential requirements, etc. The fact that banks face non-
constant returns to scale has been documented empirically by McAllister and McManus (1993), and 
Wheelock and Wilson (1997). This phenomenon led Banker et al. (1984) (BCC) to suggest an extension of 
the model to account for a variable return to scale (VRTS). They added a convexity constraint N1’λ=1  
to problem (3) above (where N1 is a N×1 vector). This condition ensures that an inefficient bank is 
“benchmarked" against similar size banks. Consequently, the VRTS technology envelops the data more 
closely than CRTS technology and leads to higher technical efficiency scores than CRTS technical 
efficiency scores. 
 
The CCR model focuses on the technical-physical aspects of production. It is appropriate if we cannot 
made behavioral assumption of firms' objectives (like cost or profit maximization). Alternatively, the 
model may prove useful if unit price and unit cost information are either unavailable or of questionable 
quality (for instance, due to substantial measurement error). If economic objective functions are 
reasonable and if reliable price information is available, DEA can also be used to identify allocative 
efficiency. 
                                                 
2
 X=[x1,…,xn] is a K*N input matrix with columns xi and Y=[y1,..,ym] is a M*N output matrix with columns yi. 
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We assume that banks minimize cost and we consequently consider in this work the input orientated 
efficiency with variable return to scale (VRTS). The cost model can be written as it follows: 
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where j=1,..,n are the number of bank, i=1,…,m are input volumes used by bank j, r=1,…,s measures the 
volume if output r and ci0 is the unit cost of the input i of bank DMU0 (which is the benchmark 
projection), that can be different from one bank to another. The minimization problem is calculated for 
each bank of the sample, identifying for each a benchmark combination of inputs and cost. Every DEA 
model assumes a returns-to-scale characteristic that is represented by UL n ≤+++≤ λλλ ...21 . In this 
case, we compute variable returns to scale and use 1== UL , i.e. we consider convex hull representation. 
Our model allows substitutions in inputs. Based on an optimal solution of the problem (4), ),( ** λx , the 
cost efficiency of DMU0 is defined as: 
00
*
0
0
xc
xcCE =                                                                                (5) 
where CE0 is the ratio of minimum cost to observed cost for the 0th firm. This approach implies that all 
observed input-cost combinations are measured with no error. Outliers may be considered as very 
efficient as data error implies no comparison unit for these institutes or they may be simply unique. The 
hypothetical bank co-determinates the frontier relative to which all other peers are evaluated, mean 
efficiency may be low as the majority of banks are located far above this benchmark. By assuming that 
measurement errors occur randomly, a stochastic approach can alleviate the problem.  
 
After presenting the efficiency concept and the DEA technique, in the next session we will present the 
data and the variables used in our analysis.  
 
 
4. Data and variables  
  
BankScope is the main data set used. Financial indicators of individual banks have been collected by 
BankScope using the audit reports of banks, completed by internationally reputable auditing firms. When 
data was not available, we used the annual reports published by banks in their relations with investors. We 
dispose of a relatively homogenous sample, formed by the ten biggest banks from six countries: France, 
Germany, Spain, Italy, the United-Kingdom and the United States. The span of time is the interval 1994-
2006. 
 
4.1 Variables definition and measurement 
 
We start by defining a bank's objectives and specifying its respective inputs and outputs. There is long-
standing debate on the definition of the banking output. Humphrey (1991) proposed three definitions of 
the banking output: the number of transactions processed in deposit and loan accounts (a flow measure); 
the real or constant value of funds in deposit and loan accounts (a stock measure); and the numbers of 
deposits and loan accounts serviced by bank (a stock measure). According to Humphrey (1991), the 
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output is typically a flow (not a stock), so that the preferred measure is an output flow. As flow measures 
are unavailable, the other two stock measures are usually used. 
 
According to Fixler and Ziechang (1992), the output consists of “transaction services and portfolio 
management services that banks provide to depositors while acting as their intermediaries". The range of 
services could be wide and largely dependent on the degree of financial development of the economy. The 
variety and complexity of financial services available to general public change as economy develops, so 
that we expect it to differ across countries. As in Grigorian and Manole (2002), we assume that there are 
no systemic differences among banking systems considered in the analysis, other than differences 
explained by macroeconomic indicators and general business environment. The precise definition of 
bank's ‘mandate' is important, as the definition of inputs and output results from the functions exerted by 
a bank. This latter aspect is essential in the construction of our model. 
 
There are three approaches generally used in defining the bank production: the asset approach (or 
intermediation approach), the user-cost approach and the value added approach (or production approach). 
 
Under the asset approach (or intermediation approach), banks are considered as financial intermediaries between 
the liability holders and the fund beneficiaries (i.e. debtors). Loans and other assets are considered to be 
the banks' outputs, while deposits and other liabilities are inputs in the intermediation process. This 
approach seems appropriate for large banks that purchase their funds in big quantities from other banks 
and large institutional depositors. Nevertheless, it is not appropriate for all the banks. In the case of small 
banks, this method does not account for transaction services delivered by the latter to their depositors, 
underestimating the overall value added of banking activities. 
 
Under the user-cost approach, the net revenue generated by a particular asset or liability item determines 
whether the financial product is an input or output. Hancock (1991) was among the first to apply the user-
cost approach to banking. The author stated that it is not clear ex ante whether monetary goods are inputs 
or outputs in the production process. According to Hancock (1991), if the financial returns on an asset 
exceed the opportunity cost of funds (or if the financial cost of a liability is less than the opportunity cost), 
then the instrument is considered to be a financial output. Otherwise, it is considered to be an input. 
According to this rule, demand deposits would be classified as outputs, while time deposits would be 
classified as inputs. Nevertheless, the approach presents some limitations. First, the user cost fluctuates 
and so do interest rates. An item considered to be an output in one period can turn into an input in the 
next period if the sign of its user cost changes. Second, it is difficult to measure marginal revenues and 
costs for each individual liability item. Thus, the answer to the question whether an item is an input or 
output becomes subject to significant measurement error and it is sensitive to changes in data over time. 
 
The value-added approach (or production approach) considers that both liability and asset categories have some 
output characteristics. Nevertheless, only those categories that have substantial added value are treated as 
outputs, while the others are treated as either inputs or intermediate products, depending on the specific 
attributes of each category. The value added approach differs from the user cost approach, since it is 
based on actual operating cost data rather than determining these costs explicitly. This approach has been 
widely used in studies of the banking industry (Berger et al., 1987; Berger and Humphrey, 1997; Pastor, 
Pérez and Quesada, 1997; Altunbas, Gardener, Molyneux and Moore, 2001; Grigorian and Manole, 2002 
etc.). It is appropriate for studies on the activity of banking groups, the local agencies being “transparent 
from a financial point of view". According to Mörttinen (2002), a major drawback of this approach is that 
it ignores many important aspects of banking activities. This is problematic when the number of 
transactions cannot capture the quality of these services. Banks that generate large transaction flows and 
make large short term profits by grating loans to bad quality customers or to customers with questionable 
motives (ready to pay high rate of interest) are not as productive in the long term as a bank that makes less 
short term profits but screens more rigorously its customers. The adoption of information technologies is 
at the heart of this, since new technology should benefit the bank by allowing it to process information on 
its customers more efficiently. 
 
Taking into account the advantages and disadvantages of each method and the fact that our analysis is 
performed on the biggest banks from six countries (France, Germany, Spain, Italy, the United-Kingdom 
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and the United-States), we follow the asset (or intermediation) approach6. This approach considers that 
banks collect deposits for transforming them in loans, incorporating labor and capital in the 
transformation process. The list of banks of each country is presented in Appendix 1. 
 
To define input and output items we follow the intermediation approach of Sealey and Lindley (1977): the 
primary function of bank is to channel financial funds from savers to investors. To provide output yr 
banks demand input quantities xi at given prices ci, that minimize total operating costs C. 
 
For measuring costs we consider the fact that a competitive and efficient institution would minimize the 
total cost of operating and interest costs for any given output. The total cost is therefore the sum of 
interest expenses and general operating expenses. 
 
We define three input and output categories. Input quantities are fixed assets x1; labor x2, measured as 
full-time equivalents; and borrowed funds x3, measured as the long term and subordinated debt. Input 
prices ci are derived per bank as depreciation relative to fixed assets, personnel expenses relative to FTE 
and interest expenses relative to total borrowed funds. As outputs we define the volume of customer 
deposits y1, the volume of customer credits y2 and the net fee and commission income y3. 
 
Table 2: Cost and production variables by country between 1994 and 2006. 
Variables      Germany Spain US France Italy UK 
Customer deposits y1 Mean 94 700 000 48 000 000 151 000 000 94 900 000 33 800 000 153 000 000 
  SD 6454 133 4 382 258 115 000 000 89 500 000 3 189 268     9 454 309 
  Min 1 859 700 5 828 700 5 247 080 7 400 1 923 400 19 421 752 
  Max 408 782 000 284 206 500 540 652 731 349 695 000 287 978 500 680 966 056 
Customer loans y2 Mean 138 000 000 56 500 000 142 000 000 89 500 000 50 600 000 162 000 000 
  SD 6 639 944 5 127 829 107 000 000 72 900 000 4 656 768 8 104 784 
  Min 1 800 600 4 028 500 4 631 511 8 000 1 937 100 21 590 617 
  Max 431 485 000 531 509 312 536 437 857 406 658 000 456 758 500 701 774 924 
Commission&fee y3 Mean 1 621 068 918 988,5 2 902 312 1 349 212 967 738,4 2 661 434 
  SD 196 022,7 102 794,3 3 080 181 1 471 847 93 968,82 200 590,2 
  Min -26 900 42 700 3 294 -428 700 22 700 141 383 
  Max 11 693 000 7 223 300 17 693 377 6 853 000 8 347 600 13 046 293 
Fixed assets x1 Mean 1 965 591 1 983 462 2 785 838 2 225 689 1 402 750 3 974 915 
  SD 159 930,2 184 487 2 230 094 2 376 596 109 108,6 342 468,3 
  Min 29 700 195 000 75 253 200 155 000 380 000 
  Max 10 384 000 10 585 000 10 094 000 12 470 000 8 615 000 27 455 000 
Employees x2 Mean 23 885 25 844 74 740 30 651 19 389 57 392 
  SD 2 046 2 836 63 625 30 363 1 736 4 246 
  Min 568 2 607 2 657 28 1 098 5 045 
  Max 98 311 129 749 327 000 132 507 139 061 298 704 
Borrowed funds  x3 Mean 84 700 000 14 100 000 31 100 000 39 700 000 17 600 000 32 600 000 
  SD 2 947 898 1 309 188 29 800 000 37 100 000 1 633 745 2 045 725 
  Min 1 088 000 54 000 45 083 1 639 100 2 000 243 000 
  Max 241 680 000 184 798 000 219 053 000 572 354 000 232 301 000 266 669  
Price of fixed assets  c1 Mean 28,52 12,56 161,59 18,14 15,88 26,44 
  SD 1,21 0,25 41,50 11,42 0,68 0,99 
  Min 0,26 4,36 51,91 1,46 -7,02 13,44 
  Max 238,31 25,19 475,46 107,92 83,43 52,91 
Price of labour c2 Mean 87 297,62 47 728,55 55 525,5 73 338,93 61 359,3 47 211,28 
  SD 2 157,309 553,5726 16310,6 9586,79 571,4155 806,432 
  Min 39 812 29 874 26 108 33 322 27 901 37 125 
  Max 223 932 74 852 141 453 157 572 114 886 66 490 
                                                 
6 The asset approach has been equally employed by Mester (1997); Fioretino, Karmann and Koetter (2002); Fries and 
Taci (2005); Weill (2006a, b), etc. 
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Price of funds c3 Mean 24,61 81,7 62,24 50,21 241,7 124,34 
  SD 2,85 4,83 48,39 29,37 47,4 18,63 
  Min 2,84 3,74 5,19 3,36 2,94 26,14 
  Max 1 226,53 774,63 987,38 190,48 1 109,21 757,96 
Total cost C Mean 14 400 000 4 629 146 17 600 000 12 800 000 3 868 155 11 600 000 
  SD 824 021,5 538 249,6 17 000 000 9 785 125 347 374,2 623788,2 
   1 951 600 471 700 371 124 289 322 333 200 2 420 492 
   65 932 000 32 396 900 91 718 343 46 343 800 96 900 000 27 981 016 
Total Assets  Mean 327 000 000 100 000 000 298 000 000 289 000 000 96 900 000 301 000 000 
    SD 16 000 000 10 100 000 267 000 000 247 000 000 9 990 851 18 300 000 
  Min 36 595 801 8 227 000 7 064 132 3 776 600 4 012 400 34 457 000 
  Max 1 571 768 000 833 873 000 1 430 763 000 1 440 343 000 823 284 000 1 485 306 000 
Observations N  130 130 117 104 130 130 
No. of banks N   10 10 9 8 10 10 
 Note. All variables measured in thousands of €, except x2 (in FTE), c1 and c3 (percentage points) and c2 (in €). 
 
The data in table 2 illustrates the summary statistics for inputs, outputs, the price of inputs and some other 
elements. The average total assets have the same magnitude in the case of banks from Germany, the 
United States, France and the United Kingdom; nevertheless, the indicator is lower for banks from Spain 
and Italy. The data in the table above shows that mean sizes in both input and output dimensions vary 
considerably across banking groups in the six countries, especially in France and Italy (where the 
dispersion is very large). For France, this is due to the inclusion in the analysis of very different types of 
institutions7.  
 
According to the 2007 CECEI annual report, France is among the high-concentrated banking system 
western EU countries, while Italy and Germany present a fragmented banking system. At the end of 2006, 
the five biggest French banks held 52.3% of the total banking assets, while the figures are of 22% in 
Germany, 26.3% in Italy, 35.9% in the United Kingdom and 40.4% in Spain. In the UK, the high presence 
of foreign banks, whose main services are not orientated towards the residents, is a bias that diminishes 
the share of the five biggest banks (these banks, except for HSBC, are more concentrated on the retail 
domestic market). In Germany, another specific factor that diminishes the share of the five biggest banks 
is the fact that mutualist and saving banks are not considered as being a unique group (even though they 
supply the same range of products on their area). In Italy the situation is equally influenced by the 
structure of the mutualist banks. 
 
5. Results 
 
In this section we present and interpret the evolution of the cost-efficiency scores for the analyzed banks, 
as well as the determinants of bank efficiency. 
 
5.1 Results of efficiency analysis 
  
The results of the DEA analysis, country by country, according to equation (4), are presented in table 3 
below. They have been obtained by applying the DEA-Solver program, in accordance to Cooper, Seiford 
and Tone (2007). 
 
Table 3. Average scores of cost efficiency by countries. 
  France Germany Spain Italy United-Kingdom United-States 
1994 86.40 88.83 95.07 94.81 98.11 94.55 
1995 90.91 86.87 94.43 97.85 96.42 94.12 
1996 96.59 85.66 95.39 99.45 93.69 95.13 
                                                 
7 The French banking system presents a concentrated structure, 52% of the banking assets belonging to the five 
biggest banks, while the “top ten" banks hold 71% of the total banking assets. 
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1997 94.77 86.85 95.43 99.44 93.46 99.18 
1998 98.83 87.14 94.32 95.21 92.26 91.87 
1999 97.09 91.81 96.23 93.52 89.58 96.64 
2000 91.05 88.49 95.11 95.17 88.26 97.77 
2001 86.55 87.3 95.02 97.17 93.41 100 
2002 87.99 86.19 96.01 97.71 84.74 98.06 
2003 87.61 83.18 93.92 96.05 84.85 96.17 
2004 86.34 79.97 96.81 93.48 92.41 96.84 
2005 86.14 78.86 97.3 88.28 85.03 95.23 
2006 91.52 79.14 98.32 93.4 86.57 91.63 
mean 90.90 85.41 95.64 95.50 90.68 95.93 
variation  +4.50 -9.69 +3.24 -1.41 -11.54 -2.92 
Note. This table presents the average scores of cost-efficiency for each year and country. These scores are 
estimated by DEA technique, with DEA-Solver program, and are expressed in percent. The variation is 
the difference between the average score of cost-efficiency in 2006 and the average score of cost-
efficiency in 1994.  
 
 
The major conclusion lies in an improvement in cost-efficiency over the analyzed span of time in France 
and Spain, while it declines in Germany, Italy, the United-Kingdom and the United States. The findings 
for France are in line with Weill (2006b). In our analysis, the cost-efficiency of French banks evolves from 
86.40% in 1994 to 91.52% in 2006, that is to say an increase of 4.50%. 
 
Table 3 equally presents the mean of cost-efficiency scores over the analyzed period of time. For the six 
countries, the average scores are situated between 85.41% (in Germany) and 95.9% (in the United-States). 
 
The evolution of these scores is presented in figure 5, Appendix 3. 
 
Both the economic environment and the banking systems evolved during the period under analysis. 
Despite the Asian and Russian crises of 1997 and, respectively, 1998, the 90s were years of economic 
growth, good financial conditions and intense restructuring of the banking system for the countries in the 
sample. The banks consolidated their position on the domestic market in Spain and Italy, following the 
trend initiated in the UK by the creation of big retail banking groups. A less specialized model is 
promoted in France, with the complementarity of products (retail and investment banking). After the 
internet bubble deflation, the global growth declined from 4.7% (in 2000) to 2.4% (in 2001) (IMF). This 
worsened the risks and damaged the economic conditions in some emerging countries. In that context, 
September 11 increased sectorial risks. Some other events added: the rapid financial downturn, combined 
with the collapse of Enron. The recovery carried on during 2003, with disparities across regions 
(particularly on a slower pace for the Euro area). 
 
Common deviations in the efficiency scores computed for the countries in our study correspond to some 
important dates in the evolution and functioning of their banking sectors. Deregulation of the banking 
industry in Europe and the United States in the 1980s and 1990s stimulated an unprecedented merger and 
consolidation wave. In the Euro area, the introduction in circulation of the euro took place in 1999 (with 
coins and banknotes introduced in 2002), forcing the banks to make large investments to adapt. Another 
important aspect in the European Union is the changeover to the use of International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) in January 2005 for the listed groups; this changed the base for valuation of some 
indicators used in our analysis. After the 2000 and 2001 downturn, the results of European and US banks 
improved substantially from 2003 on, first in retail banking and then in investment banking. 
 
We notice: 
- a decreasing tendency in the efficiency scores, both in Germany and the United Kingdom. These 
countries have very different banking “business models". On one hand, Germany presents: a 
three-pillar banking structure (public, private, cooperative) characterized by the dominance of 
public banks; a poor profitability and a predominance of banks in the financing of the corporate 
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sector. On the other hand, the UK presents a system of joint-stock and private banks (mainly a 
financial-based banking system). 
o according to Gabel (2006), the German banking system is characterized by: a reduced 
competition (a large number of saving and mutualist banks limit their activity to a district 
or a city, according to the regional principle, Regionalprinzip, so that there is no 
competition among them); a particularly high net interest spread; high costs (especially in 
the case of private banks, with 75% of gains being absorbed by internal costs). This can 
explain the relative reduced level of the efficiency scores that we obtain. 
o  according to the 2006 Financial Stability Report of Bank of England, the UK financial 
system has weathered well a series of disturbances over the past months. Major UK 
banks' reported profitability and capital levels have remained strong, with a slight 
decrease in efficiency scores. 
 
- a relatively stable evolution for the efficiency scores in Spain; these scores are high, being superior 
to 93%. The 90s have been marked by the concentration and the internationalization of the 
Spanish banking system. The results that we obtain are in line with the 2006 IMF Financial 
System Stability Assessment on Spain. According to this report, efficiency indicators of Spanish 
credit institutions rank among the best, reflecting competition and a combination of strong 
volume growth and cost containment. 
 
- a relatively stable evolution for the efficiency scores in Italy, marked by an important decrease in 
2005. This might be related to the economic situation encountered by Italy in the first quarter of 
2005. Three events occurred: first, there was the entry of the Italian economy in recession; second 
- the publication by OECD of an alarmist report on the economic situation; and, third, the 
launching by the European Commission, for the first time since the existence of the Stability and 
Growth Pact, of a double procedure against Italy, both for excessive deficit and excessive debt 
(Grenet, 2005). All these might have influenced the banking sector. 
 
- the decoupling of the efficiency scores for the French banks since 2000 (compared to 1999 and 
until 2005), then a slight rise in 2006. The French banking system faced a net improvement in 
profitability in the 90s, with reinforcement in solvency. In the same time, the non performing 
loans ratio decreased, thanks to an improved credit risk level over the period. Banks diversified 
revenue sources and rationalized production structures; their operating ratio regularly decreased, 
allowing risk's costs to be better covered. Diversification in banking activities played the role of a 
“shock absorber" (during the 1997-1998 crisis time, 2002 and the following years). The 
acquisition of Credit Lyonnais by Credit Agricole in 2003 (effective in 2005), CDC Ixis and Eulia 
by Caisses d'Epargne and Finaref by Credit Agricole in 2004, increased further the concentration 
in banking industry. According to Gouteroux (2006), the consolidated activity of the main French 
banking groups, as measures by the total assets, has risen globally, by 21%, over 2005. This was 
coupled with a rise in the global charges and in the provisions for depreciation (of 8.5%). The 
charges of functioning rose more rapidly than the net banking product, the personnel expenses 
increasing by relatively 21% in 2005. There is an increase in efficiency in 2006, in line with the 
2006 report of the Banking Commission of Bank of France that stated a new progression in the 
activity and the results of French credit institutions, as a result of the sustained demand of 
financing and the well-orientated international financial context. 
 
- the high level of the efficiency score in the US. These are superior to 90% and there is a slight 
decrease in their evolution by the end of the period of analysis. Over the two decades, the 
structure of the U.S. banking industry underwent an unprecedented transformation, marked by a 
substantial decline in the number of commercial banks and savings institutions and by a growing 
concentration of industry assets among a few dozen extremely large financial institutions. 
According to Jones and Critchfield (2006), the rate of decline in the number of banking 
organizations appears to be slowing markedly8. As far as the monetary policy is concerned, the 
                                                 
8
 At the end of 1984, there were 15,084 banking and thrift organizations (defined as commercial bank and thrift 
holding companies, independent banks, and independent thrifts). By the end of 2008, the number had fallen to 
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Fed decreased the money market rate from 6.5% in 2000 to 1% in 2003, to stamp out the 
financial crisis born from the 2000 internet bubble (Brack, 2009). A brutal increase in the money 
market rate took place until 2006, followed by a decline. The low interest rates in the US mean 
reduced costs of the borrowed resources, and this might explain the high efficiency of the banks.  
 
We cannot proceed to comparative analyzes of scores between countries, as they are determined country 
by country and reflect the specific conditions of banks from each country. Nevertheless, we can analyze 
their evolution by a test of convergence, as in Weill (2006b, 2008). 
 
We proceed to the analysis of β convergence within each country. In order to do this, we estimate the 
growth rate of efficiency indicators over their initial level for the analyzed period, as in Weill (2006b): 
 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) iiii EFFtEFFEFF εβα ++=− 1994,1994,2006, ln/]ln[ln                 (6), 
 
where EFFi,2006 is the efficiency score of bank i in 2006; EFFi,1994 the efficiency score of bank i in 1994, t 
the number of years; εi the error term of bank i and α and β are the parameters to be estimated. There is β 
convergence if the coefficient of the initial level, β, is negative and significant.  
 
Table 4. Convergence test of efficiency scores, country by country. 
Dependent variable     Country       
Growth rate of efficiency France Germany Spain Italy United- United- 
scores        Kingdom States 
Constant   -0.0172*** -0.0158*** -0.0007*** -0.0097*** -0.012*** -0.0082*** 
   (0.003) (0.001) (0.0002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Initial efficiency score -0.1141*** -0.039*** -0.0674*** -0.1396*** -0.034 -0.0855*** 
   (0.012) (0.012) (0.0005) (0.010) (0.021) (0.003) 
No.  of observations   104 130 130 130 130 117 
R2   0.4588 0.0988 0.9538 0.4283 0.006 0.5010 
Note. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and, respectively, 1% confidence levels. Standard errors are in 
parenthesis.  
 
The results of the convergence tests are presented in table 4 above. The estimations have been performed 
by the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method. We find a negative and significant coefficient for the initial 
score of efficiency in France, Germany, Spain, Italy and the United-States, while the coefficient is not 
significant in the United Kingdom. The results confirm the existence of convergence in efficiency during 
1994-2006 in French, German, Spanish, Italian and American banking systems. In other words, the initial 
level of efficiency (in 1994) is a key determining factor of the variation of efficiency during the period 
1994-2006 for every bank of the sample, except for British banks. 
 
Least but not last, we focus on the determinants of the efficiency scores obtained through DEA 
technique. We seek to determine whether the observed differences in efficiency scores are owed to 
differences in economic conditions among countries. 
 
5.2 Second stage regression outcomes 
 
The purpose of this subsection is to take a step further in analyzing banking sector efficiency indicators by 
looking at their potential determinants. As in Grigorian and Manole (2002), we assume that the provision 
of banking services could be presented in a simplified setting by the following function: 
                                                                                                                                                        
7,380, a decline of more than 50 percent. Distributed by size, nearly all the decline occurred in the community bank 
sector (organizations with less than $1 billion in assets in 2002 dollars) and especially among the smallest size group 
(less than $100 million in assets in 2002 dollars). Yet the community banking sector still accounts for 92 percent of 
banking organizations. 
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where yij measures output or efficiency of ith commercial bank operating in country j; Bij denotes bank 
specific variables; Mj describes the macroeconomic environment in country j; and Rj and Ej define the 
regulatory and general business environment.  
 
We assume that these factors affect bank efficiency in additive fashion, so that the coefficient of interest 
could be estimated using the following specification: 
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pijpij ERMBDEA εληγβα ∑∑∑∑ +++++= ,,,,        (8) 
The dependent variable is the cost-efficiency index, calculated earlier, in subsection 5.1, by the DEA 
technique.  
 
To control for bank-specific features (Bij), we include: (a) equity as a share of total assets; (b) a dummy 
variable for foreign controlled banks (that takes the value of 1 if a bank is more than 30 percent foreign 
owned and 0 otherwise); (c) a dummy variable to account for new vs. old banks (that takes the value of 1 
if a bank is newly established and 0 if it was established before 1990); (d) the size of banks9 (measured by 
the log of total assets; this variable might influence the efficiency through the “too big to fail effect"). The 
macroeconomic environment (Mj) is described by: GDP per capita, annual average rate of inflation and 
monetary depth and size of the financial sector (measured by the ratio of broad money to GDP). 
Including inflation in equation (7) is intended to capture potential inefficiencies, which could take the 
form of both price - and non-price behavior, common for high inflationary environments (e.g., high 
interest margins, excessive branching). The regulatory environment (Rj) is described by the capital 
adequacy (Tier 1 capital ratio). Developments in capital markets and non-bank financial institutions and 
their effect on commercial bank performance (Ej) are captured by stock market capitalization (% of 
GDP). The variables are presented in Appendix 2. 
 
The dependent variable has a limited nature (the DEA index ranges between 0 and 1); consequently, a 
censured Tobit regression model is used for estimating the equation (8). In cases with limited dependent 
variables, Tobit models generate consistent estimates of regression coefficients compared to conventional 
OLS estimation. The results are presented in table 5; in this table we equally present the OLS estimates for 
robustness checking. 
 
Table 5. Second step regression outcomes: censored Tobit analysis. 
    Tobit OLS Tobit OLS 
Dependent variable DEA DEA DEA DEA 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
GDP per capita  -0.105** -0.105** -0.099*** -0.099*** 
  (0.034) (0.032) (0.037) (0.036) 
Inflation  -0.018 -0.018 -0.018 -0.018 
  (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Equity/Total assets 0.110*** 0.110*** 0.113*** 0.113*** 
  (0.018) (0.021) (0.019) (0.021) 
New vs. Old 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 
  (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) 
Foreign  -0.022 -0.022 -0.022 -0.022 
ownership  (0.015) (0.020) (0.015) (0.020) 
Size  0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
                                                 
9 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing us in that direction. 
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Tier 1   0.078*** 0.078*** 0.079*** 0.079*** 
capital ratio  (0.024) (0.026) (0.024) (0.027) 
Market capitalisation   -0.006 -0.006 
    (0.012) (0.011) 
Constant  0.528* 0.528 0.465 0.465 
  (0.319) (0.324) (0.343) (0.350) 
No. of observations   602 602 602 602 
R2   0.1382 0.1383 0.1386 0.1387 
Note. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and, respectively, 1% confidence levels. 
Standard errors are in parenthesis.  
 
 
First, the results suggest that well capitalized banks are ranked higher in terms of their ability to collect 
deposits than their poorly capitalized counterparts. This is in line with the wisdom of capital playing a role 
of implicit deposit insurance, which in turn encourages more deposits. The result is in line with most 
studies founding that well capitalized banks are more efficient (Berger and Mester, 1997). 
 
Second, banks with controlling foreign ownership are likely to be more efficient than their domestically 
owned counterparts. Foreign owned banks are capable of capitalizing on their access to better risk 
management and operational techniques, which is usually made available through their parent banks 
abroad. In addition, foreign owned banks are less prone to typical corporate governance conflict between 
owners and the management. In our sample, these banks are subsidiaries of large international bank 
groups10. Well capitalized foreign banks are more likely to cherry-pick the best borrowers available on the 
market, improving the quality of their portfolio and increasing ex post returns. On the deposit side, 
foreign ownership plays a role of implicit deposit insurance. Despite all these aspects, the estimations 
show a non- significant coefficient for the dummy variable of foreign ownership, contrary to expectations. 
 
Third, it appears that newly established banks, result of recent mergers and acquisitions (realized after 
1990), are more efficient than those that existed prior to 1990.  
 
Fourth, the size of banks does not influence their efficiency scores. The estimations show a positive but 
non-significant coefficient for this variable (measured by the log of the total assets). One should expect a 
positive and significant coefficient, as large banks are usually characterized by large economies of scale. 
 
Fifth, prudential regulations have impact on the efficiency of banks. The Tier 1 capital ratio presents a 
positive and significant coefficient, as tighter capital ratios are associated with higher efficiency scores. 
 
Sixth, the coefficient of GDP per capita indicates that banks in lower per capita income are more efficient 
in terms of attracting more deposits and generating strong cash flows than banks in relatively high income 
countries. This aspect is rather counterintuitive, as more developed countries (i.e., with higher per capita 
income) tend to generate more savings and hence more deposits. But, in our analysis, all the analyzed 
countries are “developed" economies. If we take a look at data in table 3, we see that the highest efficiency 
scores are obtained in Spain (95.64%) and Italy (95.50%)11, countries that present the lowest per capita 
incomes from the sample (22,020 USD in Spain and, respectively, 24,205 USD in Italy, compared to 
26,100 USD in Germany, 25,381 USD in the United Kingdom, 25,665 USD in France and 34,380 USD in 
the United States). As for the other elements of macro environment, the results show a reduced impact of 
inflation on efficiency; high inflation is not necessarily associated with large-scale inefficiencies. We could 
not introduce the M2/GDP ratio in our estimations because of the lack of data for European countries. 
                                                 
10 For instance, in Italy, BNL (Banca Nazionale del Lavoro SpA) is a subsidiary of BNP Paribas; in France, HSBC is 
a subsidiary of HSBC Group, etc. 
11 Both Italy and Spain have registered important developments in their financial and banking sectors, catching-up 
the advanced EU countries (Spain entered the EU relatively late, in 1986, and, since then, important progress have 
been made in terms of economic and financial development). 
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Market capitalization (% of GDP) does not seem to influence bank efficiency. One should expect a 
negative and significant coefficient, as the opportunity to raise funds on the stock market would reduce 
the demand for bank loans by the best borrowers on the market. Less credit would then determine lower 
ex post returns and result in lower efficiency of banking operations. On the other hand, more developed 
non-bank financial institutions (i.e., pension funds, insurance companies, brokerage firms, etc) would 
produce a greater demand for household savings, reducing the amount of bank deposits available to the 
banks and, eventually, transaction services rendered by the banks. 
 
6. Conclusion  
 
The paper adds to the existing literature on cost-efficiency in banking in France, making several important 
contributions. 
 
The analysis widens the literature on bank costs modeling, using the DEA technique for a sample of 
European and American banks, during 1994-2006. It examines the cost efficiency evolution for the ten 
biggest French, English, German, Italian, Spanish and American banks. Our work is in line with Weill 
(2006b) and consists of a comparative evolution in the case of European and American banking systems. 
 
The span of time has been characterized by important changes, especially related to the legislative 
framework of the European capital markets integration. We find an increase in cost-efficiency of French 
banks between 1994 and 2006, the average score evolving from 86.40% to 91.52%. A similar 
improvement is obtained in Spain, while in other countries we obtain a decline in cost-efficiency. 
 
The tests of convergence performed separately, country by country, show the convergence in efficiency of 
French, German, Italian, Spanish and American banks, over the period 1994-2006. 
 
In a second step analysis we focus on differences in commercial bank efficiency across countries, against a 
wide array of variables describing the macro environment, regulatory regime and non-bank financial 
development. Through a censored Tobit regression we find that well capitalized, newly established 
banking groups (after 1990), having tighter capital ratio and operating in a country with a relatively lower 
GDP per capita record the highest cost-efficiency scores. 
 
We are aware of the fact that the paper presents several limitations. First, the analysis may suffer from a 
sample selection bias problem resulting from the fact that the analysis is performed over the ten biggest 
banks of the six countries; the selection of banks is determined by the availability of data (only banks for 
which data was available for the entire period (1994-2006) were retained). Extending the analysis to a 
larger number of banks could then be useful. Then, it would be interesting to check whether a similar 
evolution in the efficiency scores would be obtained through a parametric method. 
 
As a continuation of this work, it would be interesting to analyze banks from other countries. For 
instance, we should analyze banks from Japan in order to compare the evolution in efficiency scores for 
the triad (Japan, Unites-States, Euro area). Moreover, taking into consideration banking systems from all 
the Euro area countries could allow distinguishing the existence of potential “groups", sharing 
similar/different evolutions in terms of efficiency scores. Another possible continuation consists of a 
similar work performed over banks having different characteristics of ownership, such as cooperatives or 
public banks. 
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Appendix  
 
Appendix 1. List of banks in the sample 
 
Germany 
Deutsche Bank AG; Commerzbank AG;  Bayerische Hypo-und Vereinsbank AG; Dresdner Bank AG; 
KfW Group-KfW Bankengruppe; Bayerische Landesbank; WestLB AG; Eurohypo AG; Norddeutsche 
Landesbank Girozentrale NORD/LB; Deutsche Postbank AG. 
 
Spain 
Banco Santander SA; Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA; Caja de Ahorros y Pensiones de Barcelona, LA 
CAIXA; Caja Madrid-Caja de Ahorros y Monte de Piedad de Madrid; Banco Espanol de Crédito SA, 
BANESTO; Banco Popular Espanol SA; Caja de Ahorros de Valencia Castellon y Alicante BANCAJA; 
Banco de Sabadell SA; Caixa d'Estalvis de Catalunya-Caja de Ahorros de Cataluña; Caja de Ahorros del 
Mediterraneo CAM. 
 
United-States 
Citigroup Inc; Bank of America Corporation; JP Morgan Chase & Co.; Wachovia Corporation; Wells 
Fargo & Company; US Bank National Association; Sun Trust Bank; Regions Bank; National City Bank. 
 
France 
BNP Paribas; Crédit Agricole S.A.; Société Générale; Groupe Caisse d'Epargne; Dexia; HSBC France; 
OSEO Financement; Caisse Centrale du Crédit Immobilier de France - 3CIF.    
 
Italy 
UniCredito Italiano SpA; Intesa Sanpaolo; Gruppo Monte dei Paschi di Siena-Banca Monte dei Paschi di 
Siena SpA; Banca Nazionale del Lavoro SpA – BNL; Antonveneta SpA-Banca Antonveneta SpA; Banca 
popolare dell'Emilia Romagna; Banca Popolare di Milano ScaRL; Banca Carige SpA; CREDEM-Credito 
Emiliano SpA; Banca Popolare Italiana - Banca Popolare di Lodi. 
 
United Kingdom 
Barclays Bank Plc; HSBC Holdings Plc; Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc; Bank of Scotland Plc; Lloyds 
TSB Bank Plc; National Westminster Bank Plc – NatWest; Abbey National Plc; Nationwide Building 
Society; Standard Chartered Bank; Alliance & Leicester Plc. 
 
 
Appendix 2. Summary of indicators used 
 
Dependant variable – efficiency indicators 
DEA – individual banking indicator DEA, with deposits, customer loans and net fee and commission income as 
outputs (obtained by DEA-Solver program). 
 
Individual bank specific variables (BankScope) 
Number of employees. 
Value of fixed assets.  
Borrowed funds. 
Depreciation. 
Personnel expenses. 
Interest expenses relative to total borrowed funds. 
Total value of customer deposits. 
Total value of customer loans. 
Total value of net fee and commission income. 
Equity as a share of total assets. 
Dummy for foreign ownership (1 if more than 30 percent owned; 0 otherwise). 
Whether the bank is established before or after 1990 (1 if new; 0 if old). 
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Macroeconomic indicators 
Per capita GDP, PPP adjusted, USD (World Development Indicators, World Bank). 
Annual average rate of inflation (World Development Indicators, World Bank). 
 
Prudential standards  
Tier1 capital ratio (BankScope). 
 
Capital markets/ Non-bank financial institutions 
Market capitalisation of listed companies, % of GDP (World Development Indicators, World Bank). 
 
 
Appendix 3. 
 
Graph 1. The evolution of average efficiency scores, 1994-2006. 
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